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Newman: Doctors, Lawyers, and the Unabomber

DOCTORS, LAWYERS, AND THE UNABOMBER
Joel S. Newman*

I. INTRODUCTION

My brother and I were watching the television show ER.1 A
woman, brought in to the hospital's emergency room, appeared
to the doctors to have a life threatening illness. This particular
illness is often accompanied by temporary insanity. To save her
life, immediate surgery was necessary. She refused, however, to
give her consent.
The hospital's lawyer cautioned that, unless she could be
certified incompetent, the surgery could not be performed
without the patient's consent. Accordingly, the psychiatric
intern on duty was summoned. He gave the patient a short test,
which she passed. He declared her competent. Vindicated, the
patient left.
The emergency room doctor ran out of the hospital, grabbed
the patient, and forcibly returned her to the hospital. The
surgery was performed without her consent. Her life was saved.
My brother, a doctor, declared that the ER doctor was a
hero, and the hospital's lawyer was an idiot. I, a lawyer,
reached a somewhat different conclusion.
Perhaps our differing views have something to do with the
different perspectives of doctors and lawyers. I think that they
have more to do, however, with a different balancing of
autonomy and risk. Some people, in order to avoid the risk of
death from an unlikely medical condition, would be willing to
risk: (1) surgery without their consent-perhaps, surgery which
they do not need; and (2) a somewhat casual determination that
they are incompetent, when, perhaps, they are not. I, on the
other hand, would prefer to risk death.
I am guessing that Theodore Kaczynski felt the way I do.
His lawyers wanted to argue that he was mentally ill.
. Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. A.B. 1968, Brown University; J.D. 1971,
University of Chicago.
1. ER (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 1, 1998).
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Kaczynski preferred to risk death.
Kaczynski committed a series of heinous crimes. The
nature of the crimes themselves, plus Kaczynski's success in
evading capture for more than a decade, evidenced a highly
intelligent person, fully capable of functioning in the real world.
Yet, there was substantial evidence of mental illness.
His lawyers, Quin Denvir, Judy Clarke and Gary Sowards,
knew that it would be extremely difficult to convince a jury that
Kaczynski was not guilty by reason of insanity. 2 Rather, they
felt that his strongest defense would be to allege that his mental
status was impaired. Proof of impaired mental status would
have negated the element of mens rea in the guilt phase of his
trial.3 Further, should he have been found guilty, his impaired
mental status could have been used as a mitigating factor in the
penalty phase.
Kaczynski, however, considered himself sane. He hoped
that the trial would be a public forum for an exposition of his
anti-technology views. 4 For him, an examination by a mental
health professional would be a totally unacceptable invasion of
his privacy. Moreover, the possibility that such a wrongheaded
mental health professional might actually find him mentally ill
-a "sickie," as he put it, 5 was more than he could bear.

2. See David S. Jackson, At His Own Request: Is Kaczynski's Rejection of His Best
Chance for a Defense a Result ofParanoidSchizophrenia? TIME, Jan. 12, 1998, at 40:
Insanity, the most obvious defense, was never an option because it would have
required Kaczynski's lawyers to argue that he either did not know what he was
doing or did not know it was wrong. And unfortunately for them, the coolly
calculating diary entries and the Unabomber's ability to evade detection and
taunt authorities for so many years effectively ruled that out.
See also Michael Higgins, Crazy Talk: Diverse Views of Jurors, Shrinks May Hamper
Kaczynski Defense, 83 A.B.A. J. 34 (1997).
3. See United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1987); Insanity Defense
Reform Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 17 (1984); Government's Trial Brief, United States v.
Kaczynski, Part V, Defense Case, <http//www.unabombertrial.comdocuments/trialbrief7
.html>. Most internet references are to the web page of the SACRAMENTO BEE
newspaper. For other internet materials on Kaczynski, see <http://www.courttv.com/
trials/unabomber/>. See also the unabomb-trans database on Westlaw.
4. See <http://www.unabombertrial.com/manifesto/index.html>.
As pointed out
by Judge Burrell, Kaczynski needed to be considered sane, if he wanted his antitechnology views taken seriously. See Order, United States v. Kaczynski, 1998 WL
226796, at *9 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 1998). For another, similar trial, see United States v.
Kabat, 797 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1986). For more on the Silo Pruning Hooks trials, see
Richard Pollak, Witnessing for Peace; Silo Pruning Hooks; Missile Protesters, 244
NATION 567 (May 2, 1987).
5. See Daniel Klaidman & Patricia King, Suicide Mission, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19,
1998, at 22. See also Cynthia Hubert & Denny Walsh, Kaczynski Gives Lawyers Little
Help Saving His Life, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 23, 1997, available through the Internet at

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/4

2

1999

DOCTORS,
LAWYERS,
ANDand
THE
Newman:
Doctors, Lawyers,
the UNABOMBER
Unabomber

69

Presumably, Kaczynski accepted the judgment of his lawyers
that the mental status defense was his best defense. Even so, he
preferred to risk losing in court, even if it meant the death
sentence, rather than submit to a humiliating public
examination of his mental health.
Thus, Kaczynski's lawyers were faced with a dilemma.
They could violate their obligation of loyalty to their client.
Alternatively, they could maintain their loyalty to their client,
but abandon what they considered the one best chance to defend
him effectively.
To think through the dilemma, one must reason from the
perspective of both the client and the lawyer. We lawyers,
however, tend to see things only from the lawyer's point of view.
After some years in the practice of law, it can become a difficult
mental leap to see things from the other side.
It is in this regard that the ER episode is instructive.
Perhaps we lawyers have not been clients very often, but we
surely all have been patients. If thinking like a client is at first
difficult, we can always start by thinking like a patient. Once
we are comfortable with that, then we can ease into thinking
like a client.
When I first thought about Kaczynski's dilemma, I thought
from the perspective of his lawyers. I reasoned that, had his
lawyers presented the mental status defense, he would have
been better off. Therefore, his lawyers should have been allowed
to force him to accept what they knew was best for him.
However, having rethought Kaczynski's dilemma in light of the
ER episode, I have changed my mind.
I believe that the judge, the prosecution team, and the
defense team in the Unabomber case did a magnificent job of
lawyering, under very trying conditions. The ultimate result of
the case was, I believe, fair and just under the circumstances. 6
Viewed somewhat more abstractly, however, the Unabomber

<http'//www.unabombertrial.com/archive/1997/112397.html> (quoting from Kaczynski's
journals). See also Ellen Goodman, The Kaczynski Conundrum, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 8,
1998, at A17.
6. I reach this conclusion because I believe that Judge Burrell properly denied
Kaczynski's motion to represent himself, based, inter alia, on questions of timeliness.
See <http'//www.unabombertrial.com/transcripts/012298kz.html> at 12, and infra note
46 and accompanying text. However, any finding that someone who is arguably
suffering from some form of mental disability should have done something sooner, or
must have understood something as of a certain date, is problematic. I would be
especially troubled by any move to apply the same analysis on what a criminal defendant
"should have known," to someone less intelligent than Kaczynski.
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case raises significant issues in professional responsibility.
First, who controls the defense-lawyer or client? Second, if the
decisions are the client's to make, how does the lawyer
determine whether or not the client is sufficiently competent to
make them? Finally, what are we to make of the defense team's
claim that it would have been a violation of their professional
oath to defend their client without using what they considered to
be their only effective defense? This article addresses these
three issues.
II. THE RELEVANT FACTS
Theodore Kaczynski resigned from his position on the
mathematics faculty at Berkeley, and ultimately settled in 1971
in a one room cabin in rural Montana. 7 He became convinced
that technology was ruining civilization, and ultimately struck
back with a series of bombs from 1978 to 1995, which allegedly
8
killed three and wounded twenty-three.
While in Montana, Kaczynski suffered from severe insomnia
and depression. He also lacked social skills, and was socially
isolated. 9 He attempted to obtain counseling for his problems
through the mail, in light of the prohibitive expense of a trip to a
clinic in Helena, Montana, but was unsuccessful. 10
Ultimately, he did see two mental health professionals face
to face. One was David V. Foster, M.D." According to Dr.
Foster:
His paranoia about psychiatrists made it very difficult to broach
his psychiatric symptoms with him in a direct way. In fact, early
on in our sessions, he looked me in the face and said, "You are the

7. For a summary of his life, see Robert D. McFadden, Prisoner of Rage-A
Special Report: From a Child of Promise to the Unabom Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,
1996, § 1, at 1.
8. For a time line, see <http'/www.unabombertrial.com/timeline/timeline-main
.html>.
9. See Declaration of David V. Foster, M. D. <http://unabombertrial.com/
documents/dvfoster111797.html>. 10. See Excerpts from Letters Written by Theodore Kaczynski, <http:ll
unabombertrial .comn/documents/letters 111497.html>.
11. See Declaration of David V. Foster, M.D. <http://unabombertrial.
com/documents/ dvfosterll1797.html>. Unfortunately, Dr. Foster's declaration does not
give the date of the consultation. However, Dr. Foster states that the reasons for the
consultation were "his over sensitivity to sound, his sleep disturbance, and his fear that
his heart might burst from the anxiety of going through his trial." Therefore, it must be
assumed that Dr. Foster consulted with Kaczynski after the latter's arrest in April,
1996.
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enemy." As I have previously indicated, after significant efforts to
build a relationship with Mr. Kaczynski, when I finally addressed
with any degree of specificity, he refused to see me
his symptoms
12
further.

He also consulted with Karen Bronk Froming, Ph.D., a
clinical psychologist. 13 She reported, in part:
My own testing was authorized by Mr. Kaczynski only because he
believed that it would prove that he did not suffer from any
He was
neurological deficit impairing his social functioning.
surprised and dismayed when this examiner provided him with
the test results which showed that neurological impairments
affected his ability to recognize and interpret the meaning of nonverbal social communication. Mr. Kaczynski stated that he had
been hopeful to use my data to support his assertions that he was
neurologically intact, and instead, I had offered contrary
next day that he
conclusions. He informed me in writing the very
14
would no longer need my professional services.

These two experts, plus the doctor who later examined Mr.
Kaczynski in January of 1998, agreed that he suffered from
paranoid schizophrenia. 15 Dr. Froming commented:
Individuals suffering from pervasive paranoid ideation view the
world as a threatening place, and any difference of opinion that is
offered, including that the individual might be ill, is viewed as
further evidence that the outside world is a dangerous and
untrustworthy place. Frequently, it is my experience that patients
are unable to acknowledge the most severe aspects of the illness,
but may recognize discrete symptoms such as insomnia and
16
depression.

Dr. Xavier Amador, another clinical psychologist who
consulted with Kaczynski's defense team, agreed:
Many people suffering from schizophrenia do not believe they have
an illness and are unaware of the specific deficits caused by the
12.

Id.

13. See Declaration of Karen Bronk Froming, Ph.D. <http://www.unabombertrial.
com/ documents/fromingll1797.html>. Again, the statement does not reveal the dates of
the consultations. However, one might infer from her statement, "I was asked by the
attorneys for Theodore J. Kaczynski to evaluate" that her consultations were after his
arrest in April of 1996.
14.
15.

Id.
See Cynthia Hubert & Denny Walsh, Kaczynski Competent, Doctor Says,

SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 21, 1998, reprinted at <http://www.unabombertrial.com/archive/
012198.02.html>.
16. Declaration of Karen Bronk Froming, Ph.D. <http-//www.unabombertrial.com
.documents/fromingl11797.html>.
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disorder. Indeed, many of these individuals feel that the only
thing they really suffer from is pressure from relatives, friends,
doctors and courts to accept evaluation and treatment. Lack of
insight frequently obstructs treatment, as disagreement that
treatment is even necessary leads to patients feeling coerced to
accept care for an illness they don't believe they have. Large scale
studies have suggested that from fifty percent to more than eighty
percent of all patients with schizophrenia do not believe they have
an illness. These are not people who would be expected to agree to
an insanity defense. 17

Kaczynski was arrested in April of 1996,18 and indicted in
June. 19 A plea bargain was offered by Kaczynski's lawyers.
Pursuant to the plea bargain, Kaczynski would plead guilty,
provided that he would not receive the death sentence. Further,
he would not be committed to a prison psychiatric facility, and
he would retain the right to appeal any government search of his
cabin. 20 The government rejected the plea, and served notice
21
that it would seek the death penalty.
Kaczynski's counsel served notice that they would allege a
mental status defense, and would offer expert testimony to back
it up. 22 The government requested an opportunity to have
Kaczynski examined by their experts, and the court so ordered.
However, Kaczynski refused to submit to another mental
examination.

23

17. Declaration of Xavier F. Amador, Ph.D. <http://www.unabombertrial.com
.documents/amador 111697.html>.
18. See Warrant for Arrest, April 4, 1996. <http://www.unabombertrial.com/
documents/warrant.html>.
19. See <http://www.unabombertrial.com/timeline/timeline-main.html>.
20. See Tamala M. Edwards, Crazy is as Crazy Does, TIME, Feb. 2, 1998, at 66. It
has been alleged that Kaczynski's defense team intentionally kept him ignorant of their
plans for a mental status defense. As part of the smokescreen, they built up his hopes
for a successful attack on the validity of the FBI search warrant for his cabin. See
William Finnegan, Defending the Unabomber, NEW YORKER, Mar. 16, 1998, at 52, 57.
This manipulation of the client, if true, would have been totally inappropriate, and
would have been a violation of the duty to communicate with clients, as set forth in
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 (1997).
21. See Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty, May 15, 1997 <http://www
.unabombertrial.com/documents/death-penalty.html>.
22. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(b).
23. See Cynthia Hubert and Denny Walsh, Kaczynski Balks at Court-Ordered
Psychiatric Exam, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 25, 1997, available through the Internet at
<http://www.unabombertrial.com/archive/1997/102597.html>.
In the Nov. 21, 1997
hearing, there is reference to a brief filed by Kaczynski on Nov. 20, 1997, in which he
'personally declined to endure the Government's examination." See United States v.
Kaczynski, Hearing Transcripts, Nov. 21, 1997 <http'//www.unabombertrial.com/
transcripts/112197.html>. See Victoria Slind-Flor, Unabomber Case Begins, NATIONAL
LAW JOURNAL, Nov. 24, 1997, at Al. See also ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH
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There were briefs24 and arguments 25 about the appropriate
penalty for Kaczynski's refusal to submit to the court-ordered
examination. As a result of these hearings, it became clear to
Kaczynski, or, according to Judge Burrell, it should have become
clear, 26 that Kaczynski's lawyers would present evidence of
impaired mental status at the penalty phase of the proceedings.
On January 5, 1998, Kaczynski appeared at the court
hearing. He indicated difficulties of communication with his
current counsel, and asked that they be replaced with Tony
Serra.2 7 Apparently, Mr. Serra was willing to present Mr.
Kaczynski's defense the way Kaczynski wanted it-with no
mention of mental status, and with emphasis on his antitechnology philosophy. 28
Perceiving a conflict between the
defendant and his then counsel, Judge Burrell appointed Kevin
29
Clymo as Kaczynski's attorney for purposes of the conflict.
On January 7, 1998, Kaczynski withdrew his request for a
change of counsel. Apparently, Clymo had persuaded Kaczynski
that any lawyer representing him would insist upon presenting
the mental status defense. Kaczynski said:
Your Honor, it appears that I don't have much choice as to what I
want to do. Mr. Clymo has agreed with you that other counsel
would probably do the same thing as my present counsel and,
consequently, it seems that I have no other alternatives, and so far
I may as well go ahead with the present counsel, not because I

STANDARDS § 7-3.4 (1989).

24. See United States v. Kaczynski, Defendant's Opposition to Motion to Preclude
Expert Mental Health Testimony at the Guilt Phase and to Require Defendant to
Undergo a Mental Examination Before Sentencing <http://unabombertrial.com/
documents/psychelll3.html>.
25. See United States v. Kaczynski, Hearing Transcripts Nov. 21, 1997 and Dec.
23, 1997 <http://www.unabombertrial.com/transcripts/112197 and 122397.html>.
26. See United States v. Kaczynski, Hearings Transcripts, Jan. 22 1998
<httpJ/www.unabombertrial.com/transcripts/012298kz.html>.
Ruling of Judge Burrell
at page 10: "Whatever ambiguity existed as to the guilt phase portion of the December
22, 1997 agreement, there can be no mistake that Kaczynski knew and agreed that
evidence of his mental status could be presented in the penalty phase."
27. For a profile of Tony Serra, see Ron DeLacy, Tony Serra: A Poor Lawyer in
Dollars Only," MODESTO BEE, Sept. 19, 1993, reprinted at <http://unabombertrial.com/
archive/1998/010898.04.html>.
28. See William Finnegan, Defending the Unabomber, NEW YORKER, Mar. 16, 1998,
at 52, 56; Kevin Fagan, Kaczynski Writing New Treatise in Jail; Followers Want to Read
Unabomber'sEvery Word, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Jan. 30, 1998, at Al.
29. See United States v. Kaczynski, Hearings Transcripts, Jan. 5, 1998
<http://www.unabombertrial.com/transcripts/0105cham.html>. The Court appointed Mr.
Clymo under the rationale of Mason v. Vasquez, 5 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1993), and United
States v. Gonzalez, 113 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 1997).
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30
want to but simply there are no better alternatives.

The court asked if he had considered representing himself.
Kaczynski answered:
Your Honor, if this had happened a year and half ago, I would
probably have elected to represent myself. Now, after and year
and a half with this, I'm too tired, and I really don't want to take
on such a difficult task. So far I don't feel I'm up to taking that
challenge at this moment, so I'm not going to elect to represent
31
myself.

At that hearing, the court and the Defendant had the
following conversation:
The Court:
Mr. Kaczynski, are you satisfied with your current counsel?
The Defendant:
I think it should be clear by now, your Honor, that I'm not
satisfied with my current counsel for the reasons that I have
already explained, but that I am willing to accept
representation by them for want of a better alternative.
[Redaction for attorney-client privilege and representation
matters]
The Court:
Have you reached agreement with counsel concerning major
strategic decisions?
The Defendant:
Your Honor, as you know, I do not agree with counsel
concerning major strategic decisions, but I've become aware
that legally I have to accept those decisions whether I like
them or not. So I guess I just have to accept them.
The Court:
We were both using "decisions" in its plural form, but is it not
true that your problem is with the assertion of the mental
status defense?
The Defendant:
Yes, your Honor, that's the problem.
The Court:
You don't have problems in other areas, do you?
The Defendant:

30. United States v. Kaczynski, Hearing Transcript, January 7, 1998 <http://www
.unabombertrial.com/transcripts/0107cham.html> at 2-3.
31. Id. at3.
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No, your Honor. That's the only one.
The Court:
Okay. Are you willing to defer to counsel's day-to-day trial
decisions?
The Defendant:
32
Yes, your Honor.

Judge Burrell also made the following observation on
January 7:
I find him [Kaczynski] to be lucid, calm. He presents himself in an
intelligent manner. In my opinion, he has a keen understanding
of the issues. He has always seemed focused on the issues in his
contact with me. His mannerisms and his eye contact have been
appropriate. I know there's a conflict in the medical evidence as to
whether his conduct, at least in the past, has been controlled by
any or some mental ailment, but I've seen nothing during my
contact with him that appears to be a manifestation
of any such
33
ailment. If anything is present, I cannot detect it.

Apparently, that very evening, Kaczynski attempted
34
suicide.
On the next day, Kaczynski changed his mind.
He
requested, through counsel, that he be allowed to represent
himself. Defense attorney Judy Clarke commented to the court:
This is a very difficult position for him. He believes that he has no
choice but to go forward as his own lawyer. It is a very heartfelt
reaction, I believe, to the presentation of a mental
status defense,
35
a situation in which he simply cannot endure.

The court identified two issues. The first was the issue of
who controls the defense. It seemed clear that the only reason
32. Id. at 5-6.
33. Id. at 4.
34. See United States v. Kaczynski, Hearing Transcript, Jan. 8, 1998
<http'//www.unabombertrial.com/transcripts/010898kz.html> at 3; Cynthia Hubert &
Denny Walsh, Kaczynski Reportedly Tries to Take Own Life, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 9,
1998, available through the Internet at <http//www.unabombertrial.com/archive/1998/
010998.Ol.html>.
35. United States v. Kaczynski, Hearing Transcript, Jan. 8, 1998 <http//www
.unabombertrial.com/transcripts/010898kz.html> at 1. In light of the expressed concern
about delay, Mr. Kaczynski communicated through his lawyers that he was willing to
begin the trial that day, with no further preparation. Judge Burrell now believes that
Kaczynski requested self-representation because he believed that it would improve his
settlement posture. See Order, United States v. Kaczynski, 1998 WL 226796, at *14
(E.D. Cal. May 4, 1998).
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that Kaczynski wanted to represent himself was because the
court had indicated that the lawyer, not the client, controlled the
issue of whether or not to present the mental status defense.
Therefore, the only way that Kaczynski could prevent the
mental status defense from being raised was to become his own
lawyer, so that he could make the call.
The Court:
What the government, in essence, argues is that the law is
unclear as to who controls the mental status defense. I think
I'm probably correct in the way I coined the issue. I think the
crux of the question centers on who controls that defense. And
I believe that Mr. Kaczynski has expressed the interest of
representing himself because I told him he doesn't control that
defense. The Government's research to date reflects what I
found to date, and that's that the law is not clear on this
precise question. I think the law is somewhat clear as to who
controls the insanity defense. But that defense involves a plea
and it's pretty clear that a criminal defendant decides what to
plead. The Government argues that I should revisit that
issue, make a determination that the defense is controlled by
the client and that the client's counsels have to yield to his
desires.

That's

the

question ....

What's

the

defense's

response?
Ms. Clarke:
Your Honor, I think that the Court is focused on the issue
precisely and accurately. And I think the issue of who controls
the defense was resolved yesterday, and we believe that the
Court is correct, that it is the lawyer's professional obligation
to make strategic decisions and present the case in the way
that the lawyer professionally believes is accurate and
appropriate. And I think to say otherwise to counsel would pit
a lawyer against his or her oath, professional oath. And I
understand that there's litigation over that, but I think the
Court, for purposes of this case, has resolved that
question .... Mr. Kaczynski... feels he has no choice. His
present counsel intend to present him in a light of mental
illness and intend to present to the jury his case in a way that
he has had for his entire life a deep and abiding fear that he
would be presented . The Court has evidence in the record
already over the past several months of that problem. The
Court knows the intensity of Mr. Kaczynski's feelings that
36
that is not the way in which he wants to be presented.

Judge Burrell was concerned about being reversed:
The Court:
36.

See Order, United States v. Kaczynski, 1998 WL 226796, at *10.
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I just had a flash on-the point that I tried to make earlier,
I'm not sure I made it clearly. It involves a possible error. Mr.
Kaczynski could argue that he is being forced to represent
himself, he really doesn't want to represent himself, that he's
being forced to represent himself because of my ruling on the
mental status issue, and that if I had made what he considers
to be a correct ruling on the mental status issue, meaning that
he is in control of that issue, not his counsel, he wouldn't
be
37
asking to represent himself, so this is a forced decision.

Judge Burrell and defense counsel had the following
colloquy:
The Court:
[I]f I ultimately decide [Kaczynski is competent to stand trial]
knowing that he only wants to represent himself because of
his dispute with trial counsel over the assertion of the mental
status defense-knowing that, I would probably have to allow
him to do that, if he's competent. Knowing that he would
prefer to be represented by present trial counsel without
assertion of that defense, it seems that the Government's
position is persuasive. I'm just saying that because you should
think about that as trial counsel, because it seems to me that
if I find he is competent-and I've already stated that at this
very moment I believe he's competent to stand trial-given the
scenario I just related, it would seem to me that his present
trial counsel should represent him, if that is his desire,
without assertion of the defense.
Mr. Denvir:
Your Honor, you're talking about the Government's suggestion
is that the Court would order us ... that we could not present
the defense that we feel is called for in a capital case and
would have to accede to the Defendant's wish not to present
that defense? Is that the suggestion?
The Court:
Yes.
Mr. Denvir:
Then we would have to deal with that.
The Court:
38
Okay.

The second issue was Kaczynski's competence to make

37. Id. at *8. However, in the only instance in which this type of argument was
made, it failed. See State v. Poindexter, 318 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), described
at infra note 67 and accompanying text.
38. See Order, United States v. Kaczynski, 1998 WL 226796, at *14.
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decisions about his defense. The United States Supreme Court
in Farettav. California39 held that criminal defendants have a
constitutional right to represent themselves, but only if they
knowingly and intelligently decide to do so:
When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a
purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated
with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent
himself, the accused must "knowingly and intelligently" forgo
those relinquished benefits. Although a defendant need not
himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order
competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he
should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation, so that the record will establish that "he
knows
40
what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open."

It was agreed that Mr. Kaczynski would have to have a
Faretta hearing, to determine whether or not he could knowingly
and intelligently make the choice to represent himself. Mr.
Clymo was brought back to advise Mr. Kaczynski on questions
relating to the Farettahearing.
Defense counsel took the position that Kaczynski's inability
to endure presentation of the mental status defense was prima
facie evidence of his incompetence. Therefore, they argued that
any Faretta hearing would have to include a psychiatric
examination to determine Kaczynski's competence to choose to
represent himself.41 The government responded:
The government has... seen no evidence, no facts which would
suggest that the defendant is incompetent. However, based on the
representation by counsel today that Mr. Kaczynski cannot bear
for the defense counsel to present the defense, coupled with the
declarations that have been filed previously by the defense experts
in this case, I think that the state of the record is as follows: That
the defense counsel and their expert's position is that as a result of
a mental defect, the defendant is unable to rationally choose
between his defenses, his choices, his strategic choices at trial.
That inability is affecting his capacity to keep his present
39. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
40. Id. at 835 (citations omitted). See also ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL
HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-5.3 (1989).
41. United States v. Kaczynski, Hearing Transcript, Jan. 8, 1998 <http://www.
unabombertrial.com/transcripts/010898kz.html> at 11. Judge Burrell disputes defense
counsel's position in Order, United States v. Kaczynski, 1998 WL 226796, at *9 (E.D.
Cal. May 4, 1998). At an earlier point, before the disagreements surfaced, defense
counsel thought their client was competent. See United States v. Kaczynski, Hearing
Transcript, Nov. 21, 1997 <http://www.unabombertrial.com/ transcripts/l12197.html>
at 1.
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lawyers, which we all recognize would be the best thing for him to
do, keep his current lawyers. Given that that's the state of the
record, it's the government's view that the safest course is for the
court to order the competency hearing based on the
representations made by defense counsel
today and the
42
declarations that have been previously filed.

Kaczynski, through Clymo, also objected to defense
counsel's characterization of him as incompetent. However, he
agreed to a psychiatric examination, as long as it was done
locally. 43 Presumably, Kaczynski agreed because he knew that
it was the only way that he would be allowed to choose to
represent himself.
Kaczynski was examined in California by Dr. Sally Johnson.
She reported that he was competent.
However, she also
diagnosed him as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. 44 On
the basis of Dr. Johnson's report, Kaczynski's defense team
45
stipulated that he was competent to stand trial.
On January 22, Judge Burrell denied Kaczynski's motion to
fire his counsel and to represent himself. The court ruled first
that the motion was not timely, as it had been made after the
jury had impaneled. Second, the court ruled that the motion
was not made in good faith, but rather as a tactic to secure
delay. Finally, the court refused to exercise its discretion to
allow Kaczynski's motion anyway, as to do so "would in effect
allow him to use 'the system of criminal justice ... as an
instrument of self-destruction.' 46 Later that day, Kaczynski
changed his plea to guilty, pursuant to a plea bargain that
provided that he would be sentenced to a mandatory term of life
imprisonment without possibility of release. 47 He was sentenced
on May 4, 1998.48
Note that the court was leaning toward ordering the defense

42. United States v. Kaczynski, Hearing Transcript, Jan. 8, 1998 <http://www.
unabombertrial.com/transcripts/010898kz.html> at 18.
43. Id. at 18, 19.
44. Cynthia Hubert & Denny Walsh, Kaczynski Competent, Doctor Says,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 21, 1998, reprinted at <http://www.unabombertrial.com/archive/
012198.02html>.
45. United States v. Kaczynski, Hearing Transcript, Jan. 20, 1998 <http://www
.unabombertrial.comltranscripts/012098kz.html> at 1.
46. United States v. Kaczynski, Hearing Transcript, Jan. 22, 1998 <http://www
.unabombertrial.com/transcripts/012298kz.html> at 12 (citations omitted).
47. See id. at 16-38.
48. See Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Kaczynski, 1998
WL 226801 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 1998).
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to accede to Kaczynski's wishes, to defend him without using the
mental status defense. 49
However, it never got there.
Apparently, Dr. Johnson's report convinced the government that
obtaining a death penalty would be highly unlikely. 50 Therefore,
they agreed substantially to the same plea bargain which they
had rejected before.
What would have happened-what should have happenedhad there been no plea bargain? Should the defense team have
been ordered to accede to their client's wishes and abandon their
best defense? Did the client have the right, or the competence,
to make this choice? Did the lawyers have a right to refuse, on
the grounds that it would violate their professional oaths to
obey?
III. WHO CONTROLS THE DEFENSE?
A. Case Law
The issue of who controls the defense is one of legal ethics.
Yet, the cases rarely mention this body of law. Most of the
cases involve serious crimes, often capital crimes.
These
defendants are not terribly concerned with their lawyers' ethics.
Rather, they want to get off. Therefore, the litigated cases
usually involve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, rather
than violations of the legal ethics laws. Yet, these cases can
offer some guidance.
1. Lawyer Accedes to Client's Wishes
In most of the reported cases, the lawyer, although
disagreeing in varying amounts of intensity with the client's
wishes, ultimately accedes to them. When the lawyer does
exactly what the client asks, courts rarely find ineffective
assistance of counsel. This result holds whether the client
wants to argue in favor of the death penalty, 51 wants to plead
49. It is not clear whether the court would have had authority to make such an
order. One would think that, if the court thought that defense counsel were violating
applicable rules of professional responsibility, the proper response would have been to
report them to the state disciplinary board.
50. See Tamala M. Edwards, Crazy is as Crazy Does, TIME, Feb. 2, 1998, at 66;
Gordon Witkin & Ilan Greenberg, End of the Line for the Unabomber, U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REPORT, Feb. 2, 1998, at 34; Daniel Klaidman & Patricia King, Suicide Mission,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19, 1998, at 22.
51. See People v. Bloom, 774 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989); People v. Guzman, 755 P.2d 917
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guilty, 52

wants to reject any plea of not guilty by reason of
54
insanity,53 prefers an all-or-nothing verdict to any compromise,
wants to accept a juror whom his lawyer would peremptorily
challenge, 55 or wants to reject any presentation of mitigating
evidence of mental status or family or social history, whether
during the guilt phase or the penalty phase. 56 Moreover, the
(Cal. 1988). In Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976), the defendant was held competent
to waive all rights to appeal. No ineffective assistance of counsel claims were considered
in this opinion. For a detailed account, see Norman Mailer, THE ExECUTIONER'S SONG
(1979).
52. See Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125 (11th Cir. 1991).
53. See United States v. Moody, 763 F. Supp. 589 (M.D. Ga. 1991); Lowenfield v.
Phelps, 817 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987); Foster v. Strickland, 707 F.2d 1339 (11th Cir.
1983).
54. See Felde v. Butler, 817 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1987).
55. See State v. Ali, 407 S.E.2d 183 (N.C. 1991).
56. See Landgford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380 (9th Cir. 1996); Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5
F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1992); State v. Tyler, 553 N.E.2d 576 (Ohio 1990); Treece v. State,
547 A.2d 1054 (Md. Ct. App. 1988) (finding defendant was rational in rejecting mental
defect defense. Psychiatric evidence that defendant was paranoid, and claimed that he
was being watched by the FBI and CIA, and that he had caught an FBI agent in his attic
by nailing the attic shut did not mean that he was incompetent to reject a mental defect
defense.); Autry v. McKaskle, 727 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1984).
In People v. Deere, 808 P.2d 1181 (Cal. 1991) [Deere 111; 710 P.2d 925 (Cal. 1985)
[Deere I], a lawyer went to heroic lengths to carry out the wishes of his client. Ronald
Deere was accused of murdering three people. At first, he pled not guilty, but then
changed to a guilty plea. After a psychiatric examination confirmed his competence, the
court accepted his plea. He was found guilty of first degree murder in one death, and
second degree murder in two others. Deere then waived a jury on the penalty issue. His
lawyer refused to call mitigating witnesses, because his client believed that to do so
would "'cheapen' his relationship with his family and remove 'the last vestige of dignity
that he has.'" Deere If at 1185. Deere was sentenced to death. The California Supreme
Court affirmed his conviction, but reversed the death penalty, due to the lawyer's failure
to present mitigating evidence [DeereI].
On remand, the lawyer again refused to present mitigating evidence, again at his
client's insistence. The trial court held the lawyer in contempt. It sentenced Deere to
death. However, it later stayed the death sentence and reversed the contempt order, and
appointed an independent investigator and attorney to investigate and present a case of
mitigation. Upon hearing that evidence, the court re-sentenced Deere to death. On
appeal [Deere II, the California Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim that the
lawyer's refusal, on the client's instructions, to present mitigating evidence was
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Deere II pointed out that intervening California decisions had already repudiated
Deere I on the power to impose a presentation of mitigating evidence on an unwilling
defendant. See People v. Bloom, 774 P.2d 698 (1989); People v. Lang, 782 P.2d 627
(1989). In fact, People v. Lang made a rare reference to the Rules of Professional
Conduct, commenting that such an imposition would violate the lawyer's duty of loyalty
to the client.
For commentary on Deere, see Richard A- Zitrin, Who Really Spoke for Ted
Kaczynski? CONNECTIcUT LAW TRIBUNE, Feb. 9, 1998. See generally Richard J. Bonnie,
The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L. REV. 1363 (1988); Linda E. Carter, Maintaining
Systemic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use of Court-Appointed Counsel to Present
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cases make it clear that all of these choices can be perfectly
57
rational.
It is necessary, however, for the lawyer to investigate the
facts. Even in the face of client resistance, 58 the lawyer must
still determine whether or not an insanity plea, or an offer of
mental status or family or social history evidence, might be
effective. 59 Having made this determination for herself, the
lawyer must then communicate with her client to ensure that
the client has the benefit of the lawyer's best advice. In fact,
this advice, and especially any disagreement between lawyer
60
and client on such decisions, should be a matter of record.
Moreover, if there is any doubt about the client's competence to
make these decisions, then the client's competency must be
61
examined.

MitigatingEvidence When the DefendantAdvocates Death, 55 TENN. L. REV. 95 (1987).
57. See Weekley v. Jones, 76 F.3d 1459 (8th Cir. 1996); Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d
1180 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Moody, 763 F. Supp. 589 (M.D. Ga. 1991); People
v. Bloom, 774 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989); People v. Guzman, 755 P.2d 917 (Cal. 1988); Treece
v. State, 547 A.2d 1054 (Ct. App. Md. 1988). Lowenfield v. Phelps, 817 F.2d 285 (5th Cir.
1987); Felde v. Butler, 817 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1987); Autry v. McCaskle, 727 F.2d 358
(5th Cir. 1984).
58. See People v. Perez, 592 N.E.2d 984 (Ill. 1992). The court cited Andrew Lyon,
an expert on death penalty litigation, to the effect that:
[I]t is a very common problem in death penalty cases to have an uncooperative
client. Some clients refuse to talk to their attorneys because they are afraid;
others refuse to talk in order to protect family or friends.
Id. at 991. See also Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1985); Alvord v.
Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1282 (11th Cir. 1984). See also Linda E. Carter, Maintaining
Systemic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use of Court-Appointed Counsel to Present
MitigatingEvidence When the Defendant Advocates Death, 55 TENN. L. REV. 95 (1987);
Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L. REV. 1363 (1988).
59. See People v. Perez, 592 N.E.2d 984 (111. 1992). In Perez, the court found
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate client's mental history and
background. Despite defendant's refusal to cooperate, counsel had some information,
and could have found more. See also Brennan v. Blankenship, 472 F. Supp. 149 (W.D.
Va. 1979). However, the client's refusal to cooperate is sometimes taken into account.
See Alvord v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1282 (11th Cir. 1984).
60. See Foster v. Strickland, 707 F.2d 1339, 1344 n.4 (11th Cir. 1983); Brennan v.
Blankenship, 472 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Va. 1979). See generally Welsh S. White, Effective
Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standardof Care, 1993 U. ILL. L.
REV. 323; Gregory G Sarno, Annotation, Adequacy of Defense Counsel's Representation of
Criminal ClientRegarding Incompetency, Insanity, and Related Issues, 17 A.L.R.4TH 575
(1981).
61. Compare Felde v. Blackburn, 795 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1986) with Mason v.
Vasquez, 5 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1993); Autry v. McCaskle, 727 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1984);
and Lenhard v. Wolff, 603 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1979). See generally, Richard J. Bonnie, The
Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L. REV. 1363 (1988).
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2. Lawyer Refuses to Accede to Client's Wishes
Lawyers do not always accede to their clients' wishes.
Sometimes, in spite of their clients, the lawyers do what they
think is best. A number of these cases involve the decision to
enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. As to this issue,
the result is relatively clear. As to other issues, it is not.
3. Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity
The imposition of a not guilty by reason of insanity plea
upon an unwilling defendant is grounds for reversal. 62 Even the
District of Columbia Circuit, which for a while allowed the court
to impose such a plea on a defendant, appears to have come into
line with other circuits. 63 However, the onus is on the defendant
to make his objection known.64
4. Other Issues
a. Lawyer Wins
In lawyer-client disagreements on matters other than the
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the lawyer usually wins,
but not always. When the matter in dispute is characterized as
tactical or strategic, then the lawyer can have his way. 65 Courts
are especially likely to let the lawyer decide if they suspect that
66
the client intends to commit perjury.
In State v. Poindexter,67 the client wanted to argue selfdefense. His lawyer, however, insisted that challenging the
state's identification evidence was a better tactical choice. The
client moved for permission to remove his lawyer, and represent
62. See Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 1994); Treece v. State, 547
A.2d 1054 (Ct. App. Md. 1988); State v Jones, 664 P.2d 1216 (Wash. 1983).
63. See United States v. Marble, 940 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1991); See also Note, The
Right and Responsibility of a Court to Impose the Insanity Defense Over the Defendant's
Objection, 65 MINN. L. REV. 927 (1981); Anne C. Singer, The Imposition of the Insanity
Defense on an Unwilling Defendant, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 637 (1980).
64. See Dean v. Superintendent, Clinton Correctional Facility, 93 F.3d 58, 62 (2d
Cir. 1996).
65. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 753 (1983) (rejecting rule that appellate
counsel must raise all non-frivolous issues requested by client and citing Model Rules
1.2(a)). See also Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1980).
66. See United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727 (4th Cir. 1994); People v. Guzman, 755
P.2d 917, 933 (Cal. 1988); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 (1986); Mulligan v. Kemp,
771 F.2d 1436, 1444 (11th Cir. 1985).
67. 318 S.E.2d 329, 330-33 (Ct. App. N.C. 1984).
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himself pro se. His motion was granted. He was convicted of
second degree murder.
On appeal, he claimed that the court had erred by not
ordering his lawyer to present the self-defense argument as he
requested. As a result, he argued, he was forced to represent
himself in order to conduct his defense the way he wanted.
Therefore, he was denied effective assistance of counsel. The
appellate court disagreed, and commented that the lawyer had
the right to make tactical decisions.
Two other cases in which either the court, or the lawyer,
overrode the client's wishes both involve interpretations of
particular state death penalty statutes.
In both State v.
Hightower,68 and Judy v. State,69 the state statutes mandated
automatic review of all death penalties. These statutes were
interpreted to preclude a defendant from waiving that review, or
from refusing to present evidence in mitigation at the penalty
phase.
In People v. Guzman,70 it is difficult to tell who won the
argument-the lawyer or the client.
Facing the possible
imposition of the death penalty, the lawyer prepared mitigating
evidence for the penalty phase, which Guzman refused to let
him present.7 1 The lawyer tried to withdraw from the case, but
the court would not allow him. The lawyer still refused, for
moral reasons, to help his client argue in favor of his own death.
Guzman insisted on the right to testify on his own behalf.
Accordingly, the lawyer had him testify in narrative form.
72
Guzman was sentenced to death.
Guzman appealed, claiming that the failure of his lawyer to
present mitigating evidence, albeit at his insistence, was
ineffective assistance of counsel. 73 The court disagreed. It noted
that, during the defendant's narrative testimony, he had in fact

68. 518 A.2d 482 (Super. Ct. N.J. 1986).
69. 416 N.E.2d 95 (Ind. 1981). In Judy, the client notified his appointed counsel to
terminate his appeal and cease all efforts. On the other hand, the Indiana statute
provided for automatic review of death penalties by the state supreme court pursuant to
IND. CODE. § 35-50-2-9(h) (1979). "Counsel asserted in their verified petition that
conflicting duties, created by the Code of Professional Responsibility adopted by this
Court and the nature of the sentence imposed here, placed them in an 'intolerable
dilemma.'" Id. at 96.
70. 755 P.2d 917 (Cal. 1988).
71. See id. at 924.
72. See id. at 921.
73. See id. at 945.
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74
mentioned a number of potentially mitigating factors.

b. Client Wins
In only two cases did the client clearly win the argument
with the lawyer. In one, Trimble v. State,75 it was less a matter
of the relative authority of client vs. lawyer, and more a matter
of lawyer incompetence. In Trimble, the client's mother and
grandmother observed a conversation in the hallway outside the
courtroom during a recess.7 6 In that conversation, the mother of
one of the murder victims was seen to give money to one of the
state's chief witnesses. The client's trial counsel ignored the
conversation, despite his client's requests. On appeal, there was
77
a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.
People v. Frierson78 is, perhaps, more interesting.
In
Frierson,the first trial counsel failed to investigate or present a
diminished-capacity defense. The conviction was reversed on
79
this ground.
On remand, Frierson wanted to present a diminished
capacity defense at the guilt/special circumstances phase of his
trial. The new lawyer, however, felt that it would be more
effectively presented at the penalty phase. The trial court ruled
that it was the lawyer's decision. On appeal, the court assumed
that the decision to withhold this evidence until the guilt phase
was "within the range of conduct that competent counsel might
reasonably employ." 0 However:
Defendant's claim is that even if that is so, the decision
whether to present any defense at all at the guilt/special
circumstance phase of a capital case is so fundamental, and has
such serious consequences for a defendant, that it is one that
8
cannot properly be taken from him by his counsel. '
The court agreed, and reversed the special circumstances
finding and the resultant penalty judgment.8 2

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id.
693 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 269.
See id. at 273.
705 P.2d 396 (Cal. 1985).
See People v. Frierson, 599 P.2d 587 (Cal. 1979).
Frierson,705 P.2d at 401.
Id.
See id. at 405.
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B. Case Law Conclusions
The case law is not totally consistent. However, there is at
least substantial authority that deciding whether or not to plead
not guilty by reason of insanity is up to the client, while tactical
decisions are up to the lawyer. Apparently, it is pretty hard to
show ineffective assistance of counsel when the lawyer does
what the client asks. For that matter, it is pretty hard to show
ineffective assistance even if the lawyer does not do what the
client asks. This lack of clear guidance in the case law leaves a
fair amount of leeway for the professional responsibility rules
and commentators.
C. Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct
Model Rule 1.2(a) provides, in pertinent part:
A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of the representation... and shall consult with the
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued .... In a
criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to
83
waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.

The first two comments provide:
83. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1997). See ALSO CHARLES
W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 4.3 (1986); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 32-34 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996). ABA STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Defense Function Standard 4-

5.2 (1992) provides:
Control and Direction of the Case
(a) Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the
accused and others are ultimately for defense counsel. The decisions which are
to be made by the accused after full consultation with counsel include:
(i) what pleas to enter;
(ii) whether to accept a plea agreement;
(iii) whether to waive jury trial;
(iv) whether to testify in his or her own behalf; and
(v) whether to appeal.
(b) Strategic and tactical decisions should be made by defense counsel after
consultation with the client where feasible and appropriate. Such decisions
include what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination,
what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should be made, and what
evidence should be introduced.
(c) If a disagreement on significant matters of tactics or strategy arises
between defense counsel and the client, defense counsel should make a record
of the circumstances, counsel's advice and reasons, and the conclusion reached.
The record should be made in a manner which protects the confidentiality of
the lawyer-client relationship.
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[1] Both lawyer and client have authority and responsibility in
The client has
the objectives and means of representation.
ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal
representation, with the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's
professional obligations. Within those limits, a client also has a
right to consult with the lawyer about the means to be used in
pursuing those objectives. At the same time, a lawyer is not
required to pursue objectives or employ means simply because a
client may wish that the lawyer do so. A clear distinction between
objectives and means sometimes cannot be drawn, and in many
cases the client-lawyer relationship partakes of a joint
undertaking. In questions of means, the lawyer should assume
responsibility for technical and legal tactical issues, but should
defer to the client regarding such questions as to the expense to be
incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely
affected. Law defining the lawyer's scope of authority in litigation
varies among jurisdictions.
[2] In a case in which the client appears to be suffering
mental disability, the lawyer's duty to abide by the client's
decisions is to be guided by reference to Rule 1.14.84

Clients control the ends of the representation; lawyers
control the means. In the case of criminal trials, we know that
deciding whether to enter a plea is in the realm of ends, hence
within the client's control. Therefore, Judge Burrell was correct
when he commented that Kaczynski had the right to decide
85
whether or not to plead not guilty by reason of insanity.
However, outside of a few such specific items, even the Comment
to the Model Rules concedes that it can be difficult to tell means
from ends, as well it should.
Imagine a confrontation between two control freaks,
Andrew and Albert. Each wants to make all the decisions.
Finally, they compromise. Andrew will decide on the ends;
Albert will determine the means.
"Fine," says Andrew. "I want to travel from New York to
Los Angeles."
"That's great," says Albert. "Now I get to decide whether
you take a plane, train, bus, or car. I get to decide when you
leave, and how much it will cost you. Also..."
"Wait a minute," says Andrew. "I think I want to refine my
objective. I want to travel from New York to Los Angeles in
such a way that I really get to see the country. On my trip, I
want to have lots of opportunities to meet new and interesting
people..."
84.
85.

Id., comments 1 and 2.
See supranote 35 and accompanying text.
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"Now we're down to a bus or a train," mutters Albert.
"But that's not all," Andrew continues. "I want to travel to
Los Angeles in such a way that I get to visit my elderly aunt in
Cleveland. She's in a nursing home, and the only available
visiting hours are on Sundays from 2:00 to 4:30 p.m. Also, I
insist that any money paid for my transportation be paid to a
company whose name begins with 'G."'
"I think," says Albert, "that you slipped away from defining
the ends and got into determining the means."
Surely, Albert is correct. But when did Andrew cross the
line?
Perhaps some progress can be made by going behind the
rules and speculating as to their rationale. It would appear
that, in giving the client control over ends and the lawyer
control over means, each party is being given control over what
she knows best. If I tell my travel agent that I want to go to
New York, the travel agent has no business telling me that I
really want to go to Boston. I know where I want to go; the
travel agent does not. Since I know my objectives best, I should
decide where I'm going.
However, once I have stated where I am going, it hardly
makes sense for me to argue with my travel agent about which
airfares are the cheapest, or which airlines have the best ontime and safety records on their New York routes. One would
hope that the travel agent knows these things better than I.
Therefore, in my relationship with the travel agent, I am the
expert in the ends-I know where I want to go. The agent is the
expert in the means-how best to get there. Accordingly, each
should control what she knows best.
From the lawyer's perspective, one would think that the
ends of criminal defense representation are to obtain the lightest
possible punishment, once the client has decided what to plead.
Viewed this way, once Kaczynski pleaded not guilty, it was then
up to his lawyers to do what was necessary to get him acquitted,
or, short of that, to get him the lightest possible sentence. These
matters were clearly within the lawyer's expertise, not the
client's. Therefore, the choice of whether or not to present the
mental status defense was for his lawyers to make.
Kaczynski, however, would have argued that the ends of the
representation could not be stated so simply. Presumably for
him, the object of the representation was to obtain the broadest
possible exposure for his anti-technology views. Further, the
object of the representation was to get him the lightest possible
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/4
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sentence-preferably something other than the death penaltywithout violating the very core of his autonomy by the
humiliation of a public psychological examination.
Perhaps his lawyers had far more expertise about how best
to get Kaczynski the lightest possible sentence. However, it
would seem that Kaczynski would know far better (1) the ins
and outs of his anti-technology philosophy, and (2) exactly how
unendurable it would be to him, were the mental status defense
86
to be explored in public.
Clearly, to say that the client controls the ends and the
lawyer the means is not enough. Moreover, to say that lawyer
and client should each control those decisions lying within her
expertise is not much better.
Areas of expertise can be
manipulated as well.
Consider one more travel analogy:
Client:
I want to go to Fantasy Island.
Travel Agent:
To get there, you'll have to take a six-seater, propeller driven
airplane. That's the only available service to the island.
Client:
What I really want is a relaxing vacation. Those small
propeller planes scare me to death. If I have to fly on them,
my vacation will be ruined. If that's the only way to get to
Fantasy Island, then I won't go. I'll go to Honolulu instead.

In the client's original formulation, the objective was to go
to Fantasy Island, a matter for the client to decide.
The
propeller plane was in the category of means-within the travel
agent's authority and expertise. However, the means were so
repugnant to client that they would have destroyed the ends.
Accordingly, the client changed her ends.
This story suggests another way to distinguish ends and
means. When the means are so repugnant to the client that she
is willing to change the ends rather than put up with those
means, then it should be her decision to reject those means. In
86. Granted, this argument proves too much. In every conflict, the client always
has the option of saying that the option preferred by the lawyer would cause the client
emotional distress, and only the client is capable of weighing that distress against other
factors. I think, however, that in this case, the nature of Kaczynski's distress could have
been buttressed somewhat by the testimony of the mental health professionals. Further,
the fact that he was willing to undergo a heightened risk of the death penalty in order to
avoid this distress might have given some measurable idea of how much he cared.
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effect, those means become ends.
In Kaczynski's case, he wanted to use his trial as a forum
for his anti-technology views, and he wanted to live. When
confronted with his lawyers' determination to use the mental
status defense, he was willing to accept a substantially higher
risk of the death penalty in order to avoid that humiliation. I
submit that if Kaczynski's statements are believable, they
served to re-define his ends to include total avoidance of the
mental status defense.
Professor David Luban's article, Paternalismand the Legal
Profession,87 provides further grounds for giving Kaczynski the
choice on the mental status defense. Luban defines the terms
"values," "wants," and "interests."88 "Values" are "those reasons
with which the agent most closely identifies-those that form
the core of who he is."89 They are "definitive of the person who
holds them."90 "Interests," in contrast, are such things as
freedom, money, and health. They are "generalized means to
any ultimate ends." 91 Luban states categorically that one cannot
justify overriding a person's values in the name of his
92
interests.
Not being labeled a "sickie" went to the core of who
Kaczynski was:
Everyone has a point of pride, a trait held paramount in defining
oneself. Some might have looks or will; Ted Kaczynski prized his
brilliance. So it was in a sort of self-defense
that he refused to
93
allow his mind to be called into question.

Therefore, for Kaczynski, the rejection of the mental status
defense was in the realm of his values. The defense team
wanted to override these values in the name of his freedom-his
"interests." This, according to Professor Luban, we cannot do.
In this light, the words of the Frierson court resonate.
Given who he was and what he valued, the decision on the
mental status defense was "so fundamental, and has such
serious consequences [for Kaczynski]," 94 that it had to be his to
87.

1981 Wis. L. REV. 454.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 467-472.
Id at 470 (citation omitted).
Id. at 471.
Id. at 471.
See id. at 474.
Tamala M. Edwards, Crazy is as Crazy Does, TIME, Feb. 2, 1998, at 66.
People v. Frierson, 705 P.2d 396, 401 (Cal. 1985).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/4

24

1999

Newman:
Doctors, Lawyers,
the UNABOMBER
Unabomber
DOCTORS,
LAWYERS,
AND and
THE

91

make. Had Kaczynski only made the choice early enough, it
should have been his choice.
IV.

WAS KACZYNSKI COMPETENT TO CHOOSE?

Suppose that it is conceded that the decision on the mental
status defense should have been Kaczynski's to make. That
concession leads nowhere unless Kaczynski was competent to
make the decision. Remember the second comment to Model
Rule 1.2:
In a case in which the client appears to be suffering mental
disability, the lawyer's duty to abide by the client's decisions is to
95
be guided by reference to Rule 1.14 [Client Under a Disability].

Of course, the galling problem in the Kaczynski case is that,
if his wishes had been obeyed and he had never been examined
by a mental health professional, then (1) it would have been
impossible to present a mental status defense, and (2) it would
have been equally impossible ever to determine whether or not
he was competent to make that call in the first place.
Rule 1.14 provides:
(a) When a client's ability to make adequately considered
decisions in connection with the representation is impaired,
whether because of minority, mental disability or for some other
reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a
normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.
(b) A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take
other protective action with respect to a client, only when the
lawyer reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in
96
the client's own interest.

The comments provide, in part:
[1] The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the
assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted, is
capable of making decisions about important matters. When the
client is a minor or suffers from a mental disorder or disability,
however, maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship may
not be possible in all respects. In particular, an incapacitated
person may have no power to make legally binding decisions.
Nevertheless, a client lacking legal competence often has the
ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions
95.
96.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. 2 (1997).
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 (1997). See also, Charles

W. Wolfram, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 4.4 (1986); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING

LAWYERS § 35 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
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about matters affecting the client's own well-being. Furthermore,
to an increasing extent the law recognizes intermediate degrees of
competence ....

[2] The fact that a client suffers a disability does not diminish
the lawyer's obligation to treat the client with attention and
respect. If the person has no guardian or legal representative, the
lawyer often must act as de facto guardian. Even if the person
does have a legal representative, the lawyer should as far as
possible accord the represented person the status of client,
particularly in maintaining communication.
[3] If a legal representative has already been appointed for the
client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for
decisions on behalf of the client. If a legal representative has not
been appointed, the lawyer should see to such an appointment
where it would serve the client's best interests .... In many

circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative
may be expensive or traumatic for the client. Evaluation of these
considerations is a matter of professional judgment on the lawyer's
part ....
[5] Rules of procedure in litigation generally provide that
minors or persons suffering mental disability shall be represented
by a guardian or next friend if they do not have a general
guardian.
However, disclosure of the client's disability can
adversely affect the client's interests. For example, raising the
question of disability could, in some circumstances, lead to
proceedings for involuntary commitment. The lawyer's position in
such cases is an unavoidably difficult one. 97The lawyer may seek
guidance from an appropriate diagnostician.
98
Rule 1.14, as others have noted, is not terribly helpful.
However, it does suggest which way to lean. The entire thrust of
the Rule is to mandate a normal lawyer-client relationship, even
with a disabled client, "as far as reasonably possible." Comment
1 emphasizes that disability is rarely an all or nothing
phenomenon, and, to the extent that the client is capable, the
client should still be afforded the power to make decisions.
Comment 2 re-reemphasizes that the client must still be treated
with dignity and respect, and must be treated as a client as
much as possible. Comments 3 and 5 mention other aspects
relevant to Kaczynski's case-that appointment of a legal
representative may be traumatic for the client, 99 and that

97. Id. Comments 1, 2, 3 and 5.
98. See generally Jan Ellen Rein, Clients with Destructive and Socially Harmful
Choices-What's an Attorney to Do?: Within and Beyond the Competency Construct, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 1101 (1994); Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism:
Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 515.
99. Much of Rule 1.14 suggests the appointment of a guardian to protect the
interests of a totally or partially disabled client. The appointment of Kevin Clymo was
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disclosure of the client's disability can adversely affect the
client's interests.
Informed by the guidance of the Model Rules, such as it is, it
is time to review the evidence. What was the evidence that
Kaczynski was incompetent? There was the testimony of the
doctors who examined him, 10 0 plus the letters he wrote to
medical facilities in Montana, 10 plus the results of a personality
test administered while he was an undergraduate student,
which showed a predisposition to schizophrenia. 102 There was
also the series of crimes themselves. 10 3 Then there is the
possibility that Kaczynski attempted suicide while in the
10 4
holding cell.
Finally, there is the very fact of his inability to endure a
psychological examination, or the raising of a mental status
defense. That fact alone, according to his defense team, proved
his incompetence. 05 However, this argument takes the form (1)
you don't agree with us, (2) we are not crazy, therefore (3) you
must be crazy. All definitions of incompetence suffer from
06
circularity; this one is worse than most.
On the other hand, there was substantial evidence that
Kaczynski was competent. For starters, we have his appearance
in the courtroom, as described by Judge Burrell. 10 7 In addition,
we have the very fact of his successful commission of a series of
crimes, and his evasion of detection for over a decade.

not, by its terms, pursuant to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Rather, the
appointment was made in light of the apparent conflict between the client and his
current defense team, and the consequent inability of that defense team to give the client
independent advice on issues of representation. Yet, one would think that Mr. Clymo
was still performing many of the functions that a guardian or best friend might have
performed.
100. See supra notes 11-14, 17, 44 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
102. See Declaration of Karen Bronk Froming, Ph.D. <http://www.unabombertrial.
corn/ documents/froming11797.html>.
103. Of course, our entire concept of guilt would fall apart if the commission of
crimes, with nothing more, were proof of insanity.
104. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Dr. Johnson, who examined
Kaczynski in January, felt that the suicide attempt resulted from a rational preference
for death over life in prison. As such, she felt that it was not evidence of incompetence.
See Order, United States v. Kaczynski, 1998 WL 226796, at *9 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 1998).
Judge Burrell, on the other hand, felt that the suicide attempt was a rational ploy to
delay the trial, and, as such, was not evidence of incompetence. Id. at *12.
105. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
106. As to the circularity of all tests for incompetency, see Rein, supra note 98, at
1118-1132; Luban, supra note 87, at 466.
107. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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In addition, there is a definition suggested by Professor
David Luban: "All we can reasonably require is that the person
be connecting beliefs to real facts by some recognizable
inferential process-then the mind is not 'diseased in that
respect." 108 Kaczynski passes this test. He is not the only one
who has a profound mistrust of government. In fact, Kaczynski,
who was a student during the Vietnam era, probably shares this
view with many of his classmates. 109 He is not the only one who
Consider the
fears that technology has gone too far.
environmental movement. Finally, he is far from the only one
who has less than complete trust in the medical profession,
especially for those in the mental health field. Put these
together, and consider that the government, which he did not
trust, wanted him to be examined by a psychiatrist or
psychologist, whom he did not trust, as part of a process which
they hoped would end in his death." 0
It should not be
surprising that he was somewhat reluctant.
One final aspect of Kaczynski's disability needs to be
considered. In the ER episode, the woman was suffering from a
temporary condition. When she recovered from surgery, she also
regained her sanity. Presumably, by then, she was grateful that
the surgery was performed.' 1 '
Kaczynski's case, however, is different. With our current
2
medical knowledge, paranoid schizophrenia is incurable."
Therefore, if Kaczynski had been forced to submit to a public
examination of his mental status in order to keep him out of

108. Luban, supra note 87, at 479 (citation omitted). See also Rein, supra note 98,
at 1141-1142.
109. See William J. Broad, Campus Turmoil of 60's Reveals Themes Echoed in
Unabom Manifesto, N. Y. TIMES, June 1, 1996, § 1, at 8.
110. The death penalty lurked in the minds of the judge and the lawyers, as well as
in the mind of the client. In a discussion about attorney-client privilege matters, Judge
Burrell said: "Well, here's the problem I think the defense has. Statements made by Mr.
Kaczynski during the proceeding could be used by the Government in its attempt to kill
him." United States v. Kaczynski, Hearing Transcript, January 20, 1998 <http://www
.unabombertrial.comltranscripts/0120898kz.html> at 12.
111.
Similarly, the philosopher Spinoza, in the heat of the moment, wanted to
confront a mob, who had already killed two people. His landlord restrained him, saving
his life. After he had calmed down, one would hope that Spinoza would have thanked his
landlord. See Luban, supra note 87, at 461.
112. Paranoid schizophrenia may be controllable, but it is not curable. See, e.g.,
Weekley v. Jones, 76 F.3d 1459, 1468 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Gallo, 20 F.3d 7, 9
(1st Cir. 1994); Johnson v. United States, 409 F. Supp. 1283, 1294 (M.D. Fla. 1976);
David S. Jackson, Man Behind the Mask, TIME, Nov. 17, 1997, at 52. See generally Dan
Hurley, Imminent Danger: Schizophrenia, 27 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 54 (July 1, 1994),
available in 1994 WL 13539775.
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prison, there would never have been a time when he would have
been thankful. Whatever there was about him that made such a
public examination unendurable, that condition will always be

there. He will never "get over

it."113

Kaczynski may have been impaired, but he was perfectly
capable of doing many difficult things. The Model Rules clearly
contemplate situations in which the client is competent to make
some decisions and not others. It advises that we lean over
backwards to give the client as much autonomy as we possibly
can, even if he is incompetent in some respects.
Recent
scholarship agrees, and recommends a "client centered"
approach." 4 All doubts should have been resolved in favor of
Kaczynski's competence to make his own choice about the
mental status defense. Happily, they were.
V. DID THE DEFENSE TEAM'S OwN ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS
PREVENT THEM FROM DOING WHAT THEIR CLIENT ASKED?

Recall Judy Clarke's comment to Judge Burrell:
[I]t is the lawyer's professional obligation to make strategic
decisions and present the case in the way that the lawyer
professionally believes is accurate and appropriate. And I think to
say otherwise to counsel would pit a lawyer against his or her
oath, professional oath. 115

Within the meaning of the Model Rules, it is assumed that
she meant that trying the case without making what she
thought was her only decent argument on her client's behalf
would have violated Rule 1.1 on competence, and Rule 1.3 on
zeal. Moreover, the disagreement between lawyer and client
113. Luban recognizes this problem, and deals with it, to his own satisfaction. See
Luban, supra note 87, at 463.
114. Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in
Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994); William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat,
Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client
Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447-1498 (1992); Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and
Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1987); Carl J. Hosticka, We Don't Care About What
Happened, We Only Care About What is Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of
Reality, 26 Soc. PROBS 599-610 (1979). See generally DAVID BINDER ET. AL., LAWYERS AS
COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (West 1991).
115. United States v. Kaczynski, Hearing Transcript, January 8, 1998 <http://www
.unabombertrial.com./transcripts/010898kz.html> at 10. See Rodney J. Uphoff& Peter B.
Wood, The Allocation of Decisionmaking Between Defense Counsel and Criminal
Defendant:An Emperical Study ofAttorney-Client Decisionmaking, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 1
(1998). See Editorial, What Competence Must Mean, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 21, 1998,
at A20.
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was so fundamental as to create a conflict within the meaning of
Rule 1.7, and a right to withdraw under Rule 1.16. Was she
correct?
Assume first that Ms. Clarke was defining the objectives of
the representation in terms of an ordinary criminal defense-to
get her client off. Seen in this light, how can you defend your
client competently when you abandon your best defense before
you start?
Similarly, how can you represent your client
zealously-going all out-if you start the fight with one hand
tied behind your back?
It must be remembered, however, that it is the client, not
the lawyer, who defines the objectives. 116 Clearly, Kaczynski did
not want merely to get off. He wanted to live, and he wanted to
use the trial as a public forum for his anti-technology views.
If competence is viewed in light of Kaczynski's objectives,
the dilemma is redefined. Issues of competence can still be
raised. Few law schools teach courses in how to defend criminal
cases after the client's best defense has been abandoned. Even
fewer provide instruction in how to try political cases, in which
the verdict is less important than the public forum. Of course,
according to the Model Rules:
A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior
experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the
lawyer is unfamiliar.... A lawyer can provide adequate
117
representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.

One might well ask, study what?118
There is also the question of zeal. Apparently, zeal is less
important than it used to be. Under the old Model Code, there
was an entire canon entitled "A Lawyer Should Represent a
Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law." 119 The
following Disciplinary Rule 7-101 was entitled "Representing a

116.

See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule

1.2(a) (1997). See

discussion supra at Part III.
117. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 cmt. 2 (1997). There is one
case in which a lawyer argued that he could not accept appointment in a case because to
do so would violate his obligation to do a competent job. In the particular case, the
lawyer's argument was that he would not have enough time to prepare, given the
lateness of the appointment. He lost, and was held in contempt. See United States v.
Accetturo, 842 F.2d 1408 (3d Cir. 1988).
118. It does seem possible that, if the lawyer could not understand the Unabomber
Manifesto, she would not be competent to help Kaczynski present his anti-technology
views.
119. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1981).
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Client Zealously.' 20 Ethical Consideration 7-1 begins "The duty
of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to
represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law."' 2 '
In contrast, in the newer Model Rules, zeal moves to the
background. It is found, not in the rules themselves, but in the
comments. Comment 1 to Rule 1.3, on the subject of diligence,
merely provides: "A lawyer should act with commitment and
dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy
122
upon the client's behalf."
Even given the reduced role of zeal in the more recent
formulations, it still appears that the defense lawyers' problem
with Kaczynski had more to do with zeal than with competence.
The problem was not that the lawyers were not competent to do
what Kaczynski requested. Rather, they were not comfortable.
Presumably, in their view, standing by and letting their client
self-destruct was not what they were trained to do; it was not
why they chose to practice law.
Perhaps, it was not so much a violation of our oath; it was a
violation of our craft. It was as if one went to a master
carpenter, gave him rotten wood, and asked him to build a
beautiful table. 23 When faced with such a task, zeal is not the
emotion that comes to mind. 24 These concerns, however, do not
rise to the level of ethical violations.
The other ethical concerns, it seems, also go to the lawyers'
comfort level. If the lawyers were sufficiently uncomfortable in
doing what Kaczynski wanted them to do, then they should have
120.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101 (1981).

121.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1981).

122. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. 1 (1997).
123. See Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent
and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 117 (1979) for a discussion of the lawyer's
interest in craft.
124. For a similar, frustrating experience for a lawyer, consider the Silo Pruning
Hooks case: United States v. Kabat, 797 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1986), in which four antinuclear activists were given long prison terms for renting jack hammers and doing
minimal damage to the concrete caps of missile silos. The defendants declined legal
counsel, although they did allow lawyer Henry Stoever to be their advisor. They did not
strike anyone from the list of prospective jurors, because, as one of the defendants put it,
"All of the potential jurors are our brothers and sisters in Christ, and therefore our
peers. We have nothing against them." Gret Hitt, Jury Selected in Nuclear Weapons
Protest Trial, UPI, Feb. 19, 1985. Some of the defendants refused to testify in the trial
because they considered the judicial process immoral. See Priest Says Silo Attackers
Intended to Disarm Missile, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Feb. 22, 1985, available in 1985
WL 3791722. Yet, in spite of the frustrations, many lawyers were eager to take on
Kaczynski's case. See Richard Price, Lawyers Eagerto Defend Suspect, USA TODAY, Apr.
9, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 2052391.
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declined the representation in the first place; or, having
mistakenly accepted it, they should have withdrawn.
As to declining the representation in the first place, the
Model Rules put very few restrictions on the right of the lawyer
to accept or reject clients as she chooses. Things are relatively
explicit in the case of appointed counsel. Rule 6.2 provides:
A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to
represent a person except for good cause, such as:
(a) representing the client is likely to result in violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct or other law ....
(c)the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be
likely to impair the client-lawyer
relationship or the lawyer's
125
ability to represent the client.

Surely, a lawyer who felt uncomfortable about representing
Kaczynski could find grounds in Rule 6.2(c) for refusing the
appointment.
If the lawyer had already accepted the appointment but
later realized her discomfort, she could have cited either Rule
1.7 or 1.16. Model Rule 1.7(b) provides: "A lawyer shall not
represent a client if the representation of that client may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another
client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests,
unless.. ."126 Here, one might argue that a client like Kaczynski
was asking the lawyer to do something which was so
fundamentally alien to her role as a lawyer that it is materially
limited by the lawyer's own self-interest. Comment 2 makes it
clear that if a conflict arises, the lawyer must withdraw, and
references Rule 1.16.
Of course, one could go directly to Rule 1.16. Rule 1.16(b)(3)
provides: "[A] lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if
withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect
on the interests of the client, or if (3) the client insists upon
pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or
27
imprudent."1
125. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2 (1997). Similarly, EC 2-30
of the Model Code provides in part: "[A] lawyer should decline employment if the
intensity of his personal feeling, as distinguished from a community attitude, may
impair his effective representation of a prospective client." For arguments for and
against the lawyer's obligation to take on unpopular clients and causes, compare Joel
Newman, Representing the Repugnant Client, 86 CASE AND COMMENT No. 6, 22 (1981),
with Duncan Kennedy, The Responsibility of Lawyers for the Justice of their Causes, 18
TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 1157 (1987).
126. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1997).
127. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b) (1997).
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Given that the objective is defined by Kaczynski, not by the
lawyer, it would not have been difficult for the lawyer to assert
an imprudent objective under Rule 1.16(b)(3). Note, moreover,
that, pursuant to the disjunctive "or" in Rule 1.16(b), they could
have withdrawn even if the withdrawal would have had a
material adverse effect on the interests of the client. However,
Rule 1.16(d) would have required them to make every
reasonable effort to mitigate the harm.
The problem, however, is Rule 1.16(c). It points out that,
even if the lawyers have good cause for withdrawal, they may
not withdraw if the court orders them to continue. Therein lies
the dilemma. Kaczynski's lawyers thought that their client's
objectives were imprudent. However, it was far too late in the
proceedings to back out.
Judge Burrell's rulings denying
permission to change counsel or to allow self-representation
made that clear. If the judge had ordered the lawyers to
continue, there would have been no other out.
Acceding to Kaczynski's wishes would not have violated
defense counsel's professional oath. They would not have been
incompetent to do what Kaczynski asked-just uncomfortable.
Had they thought of it early enough, they could have declined
the representation. Even if they had thought of it just a tad
later, they probably could have withdrawn-getting out while
the getting was good. However, there was no provision in the
Model Rules that would have prohibited them from doing what
their client asked.
VI. CONCLUSION

In the real case, Kaczynski's request to represent himself
was denied, inter alia, as untimely. Ultimately, a plea bargain
was reached. What if Kaczynski had realized his conflict with
his lawyers earlier?
Had Kaczynski realized earlier-say, in 1996, that his
defense lawyers were determined to raise a mental status
defense which he found untenable, he could have fired them. At
that point, he should have hired someone, like Tony Serra, who
would have been willing to try the case as his client saw fit.
Even in 1996, there was enough evidence to give any lawyer
pause about Kaczynski's competence to make these decisions
about his defense. Whatever lawyer Kaczynski retained should
have refused to represent him unless Kaczynski submitted to an
examination by a mental health professional. Hopefully, that
examination would have resolved any doubts about Kaczynski's
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1999

33

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Montana Law Review, Vol. 60 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 4

Vol. 60

One would hope that
competence to choose his defense.
Kaczynski, faced with the refusal of most, if not all, lawyers to
represent him as he saw fit without such a mental health
examination, would have submitted to the examination.
Having certified his competency to choose his defense,
Kaczynski, and his chosen lawyer, should have been allowed to
conduct the trial as they wished. To the extent that the judge
allowed it, the trial should have been a public forum on
Kaczynski's anti-technology views. Moreover, there should have
been no mental status defense raised, either during the guilt
128
phase or the penalty phase.
There was no way of conducting this trial that would have
left all of the parties and commentators completely satisfied.
However, faced with a panoply of less than perfect options,
conducting the trial as Kaczynski wished was by far the best
alternative, in light of three incontrovertible facts:
(1) It was Kaczynski's crime.
(2) It was Kaczynski's trial.
(3) It was Kaczynski's life.

128. See Michael Mello, Unabom Defense Should Assist and Not Resist, NATIONAL
LAw JouRNAL, Jan. 26, 1998, at A21.
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